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Abstract 
Proponents of dynamic testing have advocated its use as a replacement or addition to 
conventional tests. This research aimed to investigate the effects of using vs not using a pre-
test on both the outcome on the post-test and the processes used in solving inductive 
reasoning tasks in dynamic testing using a graduated prompts training. Sixty-seven 7-8 year 
old children were assigned to either a group that received a pre-test or a group that did not 
receive a pre-test, using a randomized blocking procedure. No significant differences were 
found between both groups of children on post-test accuracy, process measures, number of 
hints needed during training, amount of time needed for testing, or the prediction of school 
related measures. This paper concluded that the decision of whether or not a pre-test is 
necessary should be based on the research question to be answered, as it does not appear to 
influence post-test results.  








Pre-test versus No Pre-test: An investigation into the problem solving processes in a 
dynamic testing context 
 
Introduction 
Dynamic testing has long been proposed as a replacement of, or an addition to conventional 
(static) tests. Unlike conventional tests, dynamic testing uses a learning situation, such as a 
training or feedback within the testing procedure. Proponents of dynamic testing have argued 
that this method provides more useful information about the learning potential of a child, and 
how a child can be supported to improve his or her learning, compared to conventional tests 
(Elliott, Grigorenko, & Resing, 2010). Dynamic testing can be used to investigate why 
children are not performing closer to their cognitive potential and provide information on 
what intervention might help to further realize their potential (Haywood & Lidz, 2007; 
Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2002). Although these advantages appear quite welcome in 
educational practice, a number of questions have been voiced over the years. To date, 
dynamic testing has not become as widely used as some theorists would have hoped or 
expected (e.g. Hessels-Schlatter & Hessels, 2009; Karpov & Tzuriel, 2009). An issue that has 
been expressed repeatedly, concerns the possible test-retest effects caused by the use of a pre-
test, and the threats these pose to the validity and reliability of the test (Kim & Willson, 2010; 
Klauer, 1993; Sijtsma, 1993). The aim of the current research was to investigate the effect of 
using a pre-test within the inductive reasoning domain, compared to not using such a pre-test. 
This effect was studied with regards to both the level of quantitative measurement of post-test 
results and the qualitative measurements by investigating the processes involved in answering 
the post-test items.  




As a response to the criticized lack of standardization in dynamic assessment, several 
standardized methods of dynamic testing were developed. One such method is the graduated 
prompts approach, in which standardized help is provided in a predetermined manner during 
the training phase. Graduated prompts approaches (Campione and Brown, 1978; Resing, 
1993, 2000) are aimed at finding the minimal number of prompts a child needs to be able to 
solve a task. The graduated prompts approach usually utilizes a pre-test/training/post-test 
format. During the pre- and post-test, the child is expected to work independently, without the 
provision of help. During the training phase, if a child is unable to solve a problem 
independently, help is offered starting with general, metacognitive prompts. If these do not 
lead the child to provide the correct answer, more specific, cognitive prompts are provided. 
For children that are still unable to solve the tasks with the use of these specific, cognitive 
prompts, eventually a scaffolding procedure is offered, which models the process of solving 
the tasks to the child (Resing & Elliott, 2011; Resing, Xenidou-Dervou, Steijn, & Elliott, 
2012). The graduated prompts method was shown to be an effective training method, leading 
to a greater increase in the number of correctly solved items than regular feedback (e.g., 
Campione & Brown, 1987; Ferrara, Brown, & Campione, 1986; Resing, Tunteler, de Jong, & 
Bosma, 2009; Stevenson, Hickendorff, Resing, Heiser, & de Boeck, 2013). The number of 
prompts given, together with the post-test score, has shown to be an accurate indicator of the 




In dynamic testing, two frequently used procedures can be distinguished. The first includes 
feedback or intervention as a reaction to the child’s answer on each item of the test. The 
second, which is often preferred in research, follows a pre-test/training/post-test format. 
During the pre-test and post-test, no feedback or intervention is provided. Between the two 
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test sessions, a training session is provided, which consists of instruction, feedback or prompts 
(Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2002). The graduated prompts approach typically uses a pre-
test/training/post-test design (Klauer, 1993). Criticism on dynamic testing has mainly been 
focused on the measurement of change between pre-test and post-test (Sternberg & 
Grigorenko, 2002). Kim and Willson (2010) however, concluded in their evaluation of the use 
of pre-testing in educational settings and research that, using a stand-alone pre-test could lead 
to problems with, among other things, the internal validity of testing (Kim & Willson, 2010). 
 An issue that has often been mentioned in research is the difficulty in separating the 
effects of training from the effects of retesting (Klauer, 1993). As pre-testing can influence 
scores on all types of constructs, the exact effects of using a pre-test will be difficult to predict 
(Kim & Willson, 2010), and, most probably, will be different across psychological testing 
domains (Klauer, 1993). In research, this problem has been countered by using a randomized 
blocked control group design. The use of a pre-test may cause higher score on the post-test, 
but may also lead to the measurement of a qualitatively different construct on the post-test. 
Training may influence the solution process which, as a consequence, may be different from 
pre-test to post-test. This implies that a different construct or ability may be measured on the 
post-test compared to the pre-test (Hessels, Vanderlinden, & Rojas, 2011; Sijtsma, 1993; 
Wiedl, Schöttke, Green, & Nuechterlein, 2004). Especially for children with intellectual 
disabilities, there is the possibility that the solution process and strategy use on the post-test 
are very different from those at pre-test, leading to the conclusion that the measured construct 
is different on both tests (Hessels et al., 2011; Tiekstra, Hessels, & Minnaert, 2009). The 
effect of pre-testing seems to vary among different types of tasks as well. Fluid reasoning, for 
example, has been claimed to be more strongly influenced by test-retest effects than 
crystallized intelligence items (Klauer, 1993).  
Problem solving and reasoning 
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Problem solving is generally seen as an expression of cognitive ability (Richard & Zamani, 
2003). Problems have many appearances, and are encountered equally in daily life in school 
and in formalized testing. In cognitive ability research, preference is often given to well-
defined problems, such as inductive or deductive reasoning tasks, because well-defined 
problems provide a clear definition of what is being measured (Robertson, 2001). Many 
cognitive ability or learning tests, both static and dynamic, use some type of inductive 
reasoning task, as inductive reasoning ability is considered to be a good indicator of general 
cognitive ability (Molnár, Greiff, & Csapó, 2013; Resing & Elliott, 2011). Inductive 
reasoning tasks can be solved by inferring a rule or rules regarding differences and 
communalities in the elements of the task, and in the relations between these elements (Klauer 
& Phye, 2008). Inductive reasoning is often seen as a key ability involved in learning and 
transfer, as learning and transfer both depend on the ability to detect rules and generalize 
specific knowledge, abilities and skills to other situations and domains (Klauer, Willmes, & 
Phye, 2002; Perret, 2015; Resing et al., 2012). Over the years, several types of inductive 
reasoning tasks have been designed and used as a measure of cognitive functioning and 
intellectual ability. Inductive reasoning is involved in, for example, categorizations, analogies, 
and series completion. According to Sternberg (1985), each of these types of tasks require 
specific types of inductive reasoning ability, thereby asking the problem solver to use specific 
skills and strategies. 
 The process of problem solving has been studied and described extensively, mostly 
building upon the pioneering work of Newell and Simon (1972). Before a person can start 
solving a problem, the problem and all the information surrounding the problem has to be 
represented internally. This initial problem representation not only determines how a person 
approaches the problem solving process, but its quality also affects the efficiency and 
accuracy of the problem solving process, making it a crucial aspect of problem solving 
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performance (Hunt, 1980; Pretz, Naples, & Sternberg, 2003; Robertson, 2001). Therefore, 
problem representation will guide the selection of strategies for solving the problem. Strategy 
use and problem representation are said to show an interactive relationship, in which problem 
representation leads the choice of strategy use, and the availability of strategies influences the 
problem representation (Alibali, Phillips, & Fischer, 2009).  
 Sternberg (1985) described problem representation in the domain of inductive 
reasoning as a metacomponent to problem solving, and defined as an executive process to 
structure the problem solving process. Contrary to strategy use, which is thought to be quite 
variable across and within different problem solving situations (Siegler, 1996, 2007), 
metacomponents are thought to be relatively consistent across tasks (Pretz et al., 2003; 
Sternberg, 1985). Problem definition and representation were conceptualized by Newell and 
Simon (1972) as the problem space. According to these authors, the problem space contains 
all possible outcomes of the solving process, and was thought to be reduced by restructuring. 
Several researchers (e.g. Ericsson, 2003; Newell & Simon, 1972; Robertson, 2001) have 
indicated that the level of familiarity with the type of task has a profound effect on the way 
the problem solver approaches the problem. Prior experience with the same or similar tasks 
may provide the problem solver with methods and strategies to solve the task, either from 
memory or by transfer (Robertson, 2001; Weisberg, 2014). According to Newell and Simon 
(1972), if no clear problem solving strategy is available, heuristics can be used as a guide to 
restructure the problem space. Heuristics can be described as general but inaccurate 
approaches that can assist problem solving, and which may lead to a quick solution when no 
specific strategies are available. Dividing the problem into a set of smaller problems is such a 
heuristic, also known as means-ends analysis (Robertson, 2001; Weisberg, 2014). 
Restructuring the problem space was found to be closely related to performance and transfer, 
and the way in which the problem is restructured influences strategy use (Alibali et al., 2009).  
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Assessing the problem solving process 
Conventional tests are usually focused on the outcome of the problem solving process, but do 
not provide information about the processes themselves (Richard & Zamani, 2003). Process-
oriented dynamic assessment was designed to enable the measurement of the problem solving 
process within a dynamic testing format. Investigating the process of problem solving and the 
change in this process as a result of training may provide information about how a child 
learns, and what type of intervention a child needs to improve learning and performance 
(Resing & Elliott, 2011; Resing, Touw, Veerbeek, & Elliott, 2016; Resing et al., 2012). 
 Despite its possible advantages, process-oriented dynamic assessment has not always 
been optimally used in practice, as the information that results from testing can easily become 
greater than can possibly be analyzed. The method that has been used most widely in process-
oriented research relied on the analysis of the verbal reports, or verbalizations, provided by 
the problem solver during or immediately after solving the task. Although this method has 
been criticized in the past (e.g. Feldon, 2010), it is generally seen as providing useful 
information about the problem solving process (Tenison, Fincham, & Anderson, 2014). 
However, advances in measuring the process of problem solving have gone hand in hand with 
technological advances (Ericsson, 2003). Improved computer technology, more user friendly 
hardware solutions and enhanced software allow for both the monitoring and analysis of test 
performance (Khandelwal & Mazalek, 2007; Verhaegh, Fontijn, Aarts, & Resing, 2013; 
Verhaegh, Hoonhout, & Fontijn, 2007). With the emergence of new technology in education, 
possibilities for large scale applications of process measurement have come closer to reality 
(e.g., Siemens, 2013). Automated analysis of the restructuring of the problem space might 
offer a promising, theory-driven measure that could be incorporated within approaches such 
as learning analytics.  
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Aims of the current study 
The current study aimed to investigate the effects of using a pre-test in a dynamic test within 
the inductive reasoning domain, both on the product measures on the post-test, and on the 
process measures on the post-test of a dynamic series completion task. To evaluate the 
process of solving the series completion items, multiple process measures were analyzed, 
such as the children’s verbalizations about their problem solving process, time spent for 
planning and analyzing the problem (Hessels et al., 2011), and the order of solving parts of 
the problem which is thought to indicate to what level the child uses adaptive restructuring of 
the problem space. By using a broader range of process measures, we aimed to provide a 
balanced picture of the effects of using a pre-test on the construct validity of the post-test.  
 Firstly, this paper investigated whether the use of a pre-test would lead to differences 
in performance on the post-test. The graduated prompts training utilized in this research, was 
found to be a very effective training method in previous studies (e.g., Ferrara et al., 1986; 
Resing & Elliott, 2011; Resing et al., 2009; Stevenson, Heiser, & Resing, 2016) and was 
expected to compensate for any prior experience from a pre-test. It was therefore expected 
that no significant differences would be found between the children that did and did not 
receive a pre-test. This was investigated on task accuracy, the use of adaptive restructuring  in 
the order of parts of the problem to be solved, the verbalized strategy, or the percentage of 
time taken for analyzing the task and planning of the answering process on the post-test of a 
series completion task.  
 Secondly, we expected that the children who did not get a pre-test would need the 
same amount of hints on the training sessions, as the pre-test was not expected to significantly 
change the children’s inductive problem solving proficiency (Hessels et al., 2011; Schorno, 
2013). More specifically, it was expected that children who did not receive the pre-test would 
not significantly differ in their need for hints on the first or second training session. Children’s 
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understanding of the type of problems used would not be influenced by the whether or not the 
children received a pre-test, as retesting only seems to improve superficial familiarity with the 
type of task (Schorno, 2013).  
 Third, with regard to the time needed to complete the testing cycle, it was expected  
that the first training would last significantly longer for the children that had not received a 
pre-test than for the children that had received a pre-test, as a result of a lack of 
familiarization (Schorno, 2013). We expected no significant differences in the time children 
needed to complete the second training and the post-test between the children that had and 
that had not received a pre-test. We also expected that the full testing cycle would not 
significantly differ in the total time taken between both groups of children, despite the 
difference in the number of sessions. Although the children that did not receive a pre-test 
would save time on not having to make the pre-test, the additional time needed on the other 
phases was expected to compensate for the difference in number of sessions.  
 Fourth, the prediction of post-test accuracy from process measures was expected to not 
significantly differ for both groups of children. It was also expected that the pattern of 
correlations with external measures for cognitive functioning (i.e. school performance) would 
not reveal any significant differences between both groups of children, as the graduated 
prompts training was expected to equalize the factors involved in post-test success and 
determine the construct validity of the post-test by providing strategies to successfully solve 
the post-test items (Hessels et al., 2011; Tiekstra et al., 2009). 
 Fifth, the results were, in an explorative manner, analyzed at item level. Analyzing 
averaged scores over multiple items could lead to a distorted picture of the importance and 
diversity of process components such as strategies (Siegler, 1987). It was expected that the 
process measures would significantly contribute to the prediction of item success. Whether or 
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The participants for this study were 67 children, 28 boys and 39 girls (M = 7.9 years; SD = 
.40). The children were recruited from grade 2 classes in regular primary schools in the 
Netherlands. Informed consent was obtained from the parents before testing started. Five 
children were not able to participate in all the sessions due to illness, and were excluded from 
the sample.  
 
Design and procedure 
For the current research, a modified pre-test/post-test control group design was used. Table 1 
contains a graphic representation of the design. Children were matched based on their scores 
on the Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices test. Based on this matching procedure children 
were randomly assigned to either the Pre-test or the No Pre-test condition for the dynamic 
series completion puppet task. Children in the Pre-test condition received a pre-test, two 
training sessions, and a post-test. Children in the No Pre-test condition did not receive a pre-
test, but did receive the two training sessions and the post-test.  
 The Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices were completed in class, where each child 
worked from an individual booklet and answering sheet. The series completion puppet task 
was completed individually by the children in a separate room. The tasks were executed on an 
electronic console that provided all the necessary instructions, feedback and training. The 
examiners were not involved in the testing procedure, but were present to record the results on 
hardcopies to provide a back-up in case the console did not properly record the results, and to 
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escort the children from and back to class. All sessions took around 30-45 minutes and were 
performed with approximately one week in between sessions. 
 
 
Table 1 about here 
 
Materials 
 Raven’s Standard Progressive Matrices. The Raven’s Matrices were used to obtain 
a global estimate of the children’s inductive reasoning ability (Raven, Raven, & Court, 1998). 
The test consists of 60 items which progressively become more complex and are generally 
considered as a sound test of inductive reasoning ability (Perret, 2015).  
 Series completion puppet task. The main task used in this research was the dynamic 
series completion puppet task (Resing & Elliott, 2011; Resing et al., 2016). In order to find 
the correct answer, the child first had to identify the relations between the elements of the 
series. Secondly, the child had to find the periodicity in the series, to identify what constituted 
a full cycle of the pattern. Finally, the child had to complete the pattern, by formulating a final 
rule for all positions that completed the sequence (Resing & Elliott, 2011; Simon & 
Kotovsky, 1963). The series used in this research consisted of six puppets. Each puppet in 
turn consisted of eight pieces. The dynamic series completion puppet task was designed as a 
dynamic test of inductive reasoning. To this end, it used a pre-test-training-post-test design. 
The pre-test and post-test contained 12 items and started with an example item. The pre- and 
post-test items were isomorph; they were designed to have the same level of difficulty and 
required the same reasoning processes. Within the pre- and post-test, the items were presented 
in an increasing level of difficulty.  
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 The training phase consisted of two training sessions, which both contained 6 items. 
The training sessions utilized Resing's (1993, 2000) graduated prompts format. The prompts 
were provided in a hierarchical order, starting with very global, metacognitive prompts, 
through cognitive, task-specific prompts. If a child was not able to use these prompts to 
provide a correct answer, a scaffolding procedure was offered, modelling the process of 
solving the task step by step. Help would only be offered if and when a child was not able to 
solve the task independently.  
 Electronic tangible console. The dynamic series completion puppet task was 
administered with the use of an electronic tangible console, called the TagTiles system 
(Serious Toys, 2011). This console was used as the surface on which the child was to 
construct the answer to the series completion task, using tangible blocks that were enhanced 
with electronic RFID tags. The console had a 12x12 electronic grid which detected and 
recorded the placement and movement of the blocks. Through audio facilities, the console 
provided the child with all the necessary instructions and prompts. It also provided visual 
feedback with built-in multicolor LEDs. The use of the TagTiles system enabled full 
standardization of the instructions and training procedure (Verhaegh et al., 2013; Verhaegh, 
Fontijn, & Hoonhout, 2007). All recorded data on the console was saved into log files on SD 
cards, which could be used to import the data on a computer for further analysis.  
Scholastic achievement (Cito) tests. As a measure of scholastic achievement, the 
standardized test results of a biannual Dutch scholastic achievement test (Cito) were obtained 
from the schools. These norm-referenced tests (Keuning et al., 2015) are widely used in 
schools throughout the Netherlands. They are administered in January and June of each year, 
to monitor children’s progress in school subjects (Janssen, Hop, & Wouda, 2015; Jolink, 
Tomesen, Hilte, Weekers, & Engelen, 2015). For this research, the achievement test scores for 
Mathematics (Janssen et al., 2015) and Reading Comprehension (Jolink et al., 2015) were 
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used. Children’s scores on both these tests can range from A to E. An ‘A’ score indicates very 
good performance, as the child’s performance scores within the top 25 percent, ‘B’ scores 
indicate good performance in the subject, with a score that falls between the 26
th
 and the 50
th
 





percentile. Within the lower range, the tests distinguish two categories, with ‘D’ indicating 




 percentile, and finally ‘E’ scores, which 
represent very weak scores, as these correspond to the lowest 10 percent scores (Janssen et al., 
2015; Jolink et al., 2015; Keuning et al., 2015). 
 
Scoring and analyses 
After testing, all data was imported into Microsoft Excel, where it was cleared of irrelevant 
data such as accidental movements of the blocks. All relevant data were entered into SPSS 
and if necessary, missing electronic data was retrieved from hardcopies made by the 
examiners. All data could be retrieved from the log files or the hardcopies, except for the time 
intervals used to calculate the planning time and total time. For children where the time 
intervals of an item were missing (maximally 3 items per testing session), the planning time 
for the full test was averaged over the remaining items. Missing total times were treated as 
missing and excluded from the analyses.  
 Accuracy. The child’s accuracy score in answering the series completion puppet task 
items was based on the number of correct body parts the child placed during the test items. 
Each puppet consisted of 8 body parts. As the pre-test and post-test both consisted of 12 
items, this score could theoretically range between 0 and 96.  
Number of hints. The total number of hints a child needed per training sessions was 
calculated. Each training session consisted of 6 items, with a maximum of 4 possible hints per 
item. Per session this amounted to a maximum score of 24 hints.  
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Grouping of the answer pieces (GAP). To investigate the restructuring of the 
problem space, the placement of the answer pieces was analyzed and scored on the use of 
adaptive grouping of the pieces. Adaptive grouping of the answer pieces is considered to 
indicate restructuring of the problem through the use of a division of the problem into smaller 
sub-problems (Newell & Simon, 1972; Pretz et al., 2003; Robertson, 2001). All items were 
analyzed to determine which combinations of pieces would be considered helpful when 
grouped together. The sequence of placement of the puppet pieces would be considered 
“grouped” if pieces that went through the same transformation or showed similarities in color, 
pattern, or anatomy, were placed in immediate succession of each other. Every puppet piece 
had its own identification number, so sub-groups in sequences could be identified. The 
numbers ranged from one to eight in the following order: (1) head, (2) left arm, (3) right arm, 
(4) left body, (5) middle body, (6) right body), (7) left leg, (8) right leg. The number of 
adaptive groups a child used was divided by the number of possible groups in that item, 
leading to a score that indicates the proportion of groups used to structure the answering 
process. The scoring of the grouping of answer pieces was automated by the use of multiple 
formulae in Microsoft Excel. An example item of the puppet series completion task was 
displayed in Figure 1. For this item, three groups of puppet pieces were distinguished. The 
first group of puppet pieces consisted of the three body parts, as they move through the same 
transformation and can be grouped together based on the puppet anatomy. The second group 
of puppet pieces for this item entailed the left arm and left leg, which go through the same 
transformation. The third was formed by the right arm and right leg, which also go through 
the same transformation. The heads were left out of the GAP measure, as a single piece 
cannot be grouped. The number of groups per item ranged between 2 and 5.   
 
Figure 1 about here 




Verbalized strategy use. Children’s problem solving strategies were assessed by 
requiring them to explain how they solved the problem after children had provided an answer. 
The verbalizations of the children were recorded on audio and scored on their level of 
inductive explanation of the rule required to solve the task. Three levels of verbalizations 
were discerned, (I) non-inductive, (II) incomplete inductive, and (III) full inductive, as 
depicted in Figure 2. Based on their verbalizations per item, a score was calculated for the full 
pre- and post-test. This verbalization class was scored on a five point scale and was based on 
the type of verbalization that was used for more than 33% of the items by the child for that 
phase. If children used two types of verbalizations more than 33% of the items, then children 
were allocated to a mixed strategy class. More information about the scoring method can be 
found in earlier papers (e.g. Elliott & Resing, 2015; Resing et al., 2016).  
 
Figure 2 about here 
 
Planning time. Based on the times of placement of the answering pieces, an adapted 
version of the formula of Kossowska and Nȩcka (1994) was used to calculate the proportion 
of time the problem solver spent on the initial stages of the task (Resing et al., 2012). The 
formula calculated the proportion of time spent on the placement of the first two pieces of the 
puppet, as most children have shown to place the head of the puppet first and then continue to 
complete the rest of the puppet. The planning time was theorized to represent the time taken 
to analyze the task before providing an answer. More time spent on the initial analysis was 
thought to represent a more reflective style of answering, which was thought to be more 
advanced than a more impulsive style of answering (Resing & Elliott, 2011).  
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Total time. The total time in milliseconds for each session was extracted from the log 
files. The total time was measured from the start of the testing session, when the console 
started with the welcome sound, until the end of the last item. The total time for the complete 
testing cycle consisted of the sum of all sessions per child.  
CHAID tree analysis. As mentioned by Siegler (1987), averaging process data over 
multiple items, can lead to a distorted picture of strategy use. To investigate the factors that 
contribute to the prediction of a construct, linear analyses are most often used. Nevertheless, 
the relationships between process measures and outcome variables often contains complex 
interactions and non-linear relationships (Dodonova & Dodonov, 2013; Goldhammer et al., 
2014; Tenison et al., 2014), for which linear analyses do not provide adequate tools 
(McArdle, 2014; Ritschard, 2014). CHAID tree analysis was developed to detect and explore 
interactions and non-linear relationships. In this tree analysis, the data is split in order to 
achieve the maximal difference between groups on the dependent variable. The splitting of 
the groups is continued until a pre-determined stopping criterion is reached. The CHAID 
method in particular allows for splitting into multiple groups at once, based on a single 
predictor variable. The resulting groups are called “Nodes” (McArdle, 2014). For each 
predictor, CHAID determines the number of splits that would provide optimal prediction, and 
the points at which these splits should be cut off. CHAID was based on the Chi-square test, 
using the p-value with Bonferroni correction to determine which splits are made. 
Additionally, the minimum number of cases for each split can be determined manually to 
avoid overfitting the model (Ritschard, 2014).   
 
Results 
To be able to investigate any differences on the post-test level, any differences between the 
two groups prior to testing should be ruled out. To this end, a one-way ANOVA was 
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conducted with the Raven scores as the dependent variable, and the Condition (pre-test/no 
pre-test) as the independent variable. No significant difference was found between the groups 
(F(1, 65) = .36, p = .55, η
2
 = .01), indicating that any differences between the groups on 
subsequent measures could be interpreted as a result of the procedure. Additionally, a 
Repeated Measures ANOVA was used to ensure the training procedure led to increased 
accuracy from the pre-test to the post-test. The analysis showed a significant effect for session 
(F(1, 31) = 12.11, p = .002, η
2
 = .28), indicating increased accuracy as a result of the training.  
 
The effect of a pre-test on post-test performance 
First, this paper investigated whether the use of a pre-test would lead to differences in 
performance on the post-test. A one-way ANOVA with Post-test Accuracy as the dependent 
variable, and Condition as the independent variable was used (Table 2), which revealed no 
significant differences between the two groups (p = .29). In line with our hypothesis, whether 
or not a child had received a pre-test did not lead to any significant differences on post-test 
accuracy scores. Furthermore, it was expected that there would be no differences between the 
group that received the pre-test and the group that did not receive the pre-test on any of the 
process measures on the series completion post-test. One-way ANOVAs (shown in Table 2) 
showed no significant differences between the two groups on the post-test on GAP (p = .72), 
Verbalized strategy use (p = .75), or Planning time (p = .66). In line with our expectation, 
there were no significant differences in the level of advancement of the process used to solve 
the problems on the post-test between the groups as a result of receiving a pre-test.  
 
Table 2 about here 
 
The effect of a pre-test on the number of hints needed during training 
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Second, we expected no significant difference between children that had and that had not 
received a pretest on the amount of hints they needed during the training sessions. To 
investigate this, first a one-way ANOVA was used, with the number of hints needed on the 
first training session as the dependent variable, and Condition as the independent variable. No 
significant difference between the amount of hints needed was found between the groups 
(F(1, 65) = 1.54, p = .22, η
2
 = .02). In line with our expectations, the group that had not 
received a pre-test did not require significantly more hints than the group that had received a 
pre-test. Similarly, no differences were found on the number of hints needed between both 
groups during the second training session (F(1, 65) = .40, p = .53, η
2
 = .01). To evaluate any 
differences in the need for hints over the complete training phase, a Repeated Measures 
ANOVA was used, with session (training 1/training 2) as the within-subject factor, and 
Condition as the between-subjects factor. A significant main effect was found for Session 
(F(1, 65) = 7.65, p = .007, η
2
 = .11), but not for Condition (F(1, 65) = 1.01, p = .31, η
2
 = .02). 
No significant interaction effect was found for Session x Condition (F(1, 65) = .78, p = .38, η
2
 
= .01). No significant differences were found between the group that had received a pre-test 
and the group that had not on the amount of hints needed during the two training sessions.  
 
Time at the different phases and total time 
With regards to the time needed to complete the testing cycle, it was expected that the first 
training would last significantly longer for the children that had not received a pre-test than 
for the children that had received a pre-test. To investigate this, a one-way ANOVA was 
employed with Time taken for training 1 as the dependent variable, and Condition as the 
independent variable. The results revealed no significant differences between the groups (p = 
.83). On the second training, post-test, and the full testing cycle, we expected no significant 
differences in the time they took to administer. One-way ANOVAs were conducted on which 
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no significant differences were found between the group that received the pre-test and the 
group that did not receive the pre-test (Table 3) on the time needed for Training 2 (p = .15), 
Post-test (p = .06), or the total testing cycle (p = .49). Table 4 contains the average time in 
minutes per phase. No differences were found between the two groups on any of the testing 
phases regarding the time it took to administer them.  
 
Table 3 & 4 about here 
  
Differences in relations 
Next, the prediction of post-test accuracy from process measures was expected to be not 
significantly different in both groups. A multiple regression analysis was used, with Post-test 
Accuracy as the dependent variable and Number of hints needed during the training sessions, 
Post-test Verbalized strategy use, Post-test GAP, and Post-test Planning time as the 
independent variables. To account for the pre-test, a split file for condition was used. The 
regression for the group who had received a pre-test (N=32) indicated that the model 
explained 65.0% of the variance (R
2 
= .70, F (4, 27) = 15.39, p < .001). The Number of hints 
needed during the training sessions significantly predicted Post-test accuracy (β = -.76, p < 
.001). Neither Verbalized strategy use on the post-test (β = .18, p = .15), nor Post-test GAP (β 
= .02, p = .90) and Planning time (β = .16, p = .16) contributed significantly to the prediction 
of post-test accuracy. In the group that had not received a pre-test (N=35), the model 
explained 53.0% of the variance (R
2 
= .59, F (4, 30) = 10.57, p < .001). Here, too, the Number 
of hints needed during the training sessions significantly predicted Post-test accuracy (β = -
.62, p < .001), whereas the other three variables, Verbalized strategy use on the post-test  (β = 
.21, p = .14), Post-test GAP (β = .17, p = .17), and Post-test planning time (β = -.10, p = .47) 
did not contribute to the prediction of post-test accuracy. In line with our expectation, the 
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prediction of post-test accuracy from process measures was not significantly different for the 
group that had received a pre-test and the group that had not received a pre-test. The number 
of hints children needed during the training sessions was found to be the only predictor for 
post-test accuracy for both groups.   
 It was further expected that the pattern of correlations for the Post-test would not 
significantly differ between both groups. Correlations were calculated between Post-test 
accuracy, Total number of hints needed during training, Verbalized strategy use, GAP, and 
Planning time, to investigate whether there were different factors between both groups that 
contributed to task success. The results are presented in Table 5. For the group that had 
received the pre-test (N = 32), the Total number of hints was negatively correlated with Post-
test accuracy (r = -.81, p ≤ .001). The only process measure that correlated with Post-test 
accuracy was the Verbalized strategy (r = .46, p ≤ .01). For the group that had not received 
the pre-test (N = 35), the Total number of hints was also negatively correlated with Post-test 
accuracy (r = -.71, p ≤ .001). Both Verbalized strategy (r = .46, p ≤ .01) and GAP (r = .35, p ≤ 
.05) were correlated with Post-test accuracy. However, Fisher’s r-to-z transformations showed 
that these differences were not significant for Total number of hints (p = .35), Verbalized 
strategy (p > .99), GAP (p = .26), or Planning time (p = .80). These findings support our 
expectation that there no significant differences exist between the patterns of relations with 
internal measures for both groups.  
 It was also expected that the pattern of correlations with external measures for 
cognitive functioning (i.e. school performance) would not significantly differ for both groups. 
Correlations were calculated between Post-test accuracy, Total number of hints, Verbalized 
strategy, post-test GAP, Cito math scores, and Cito reading comprehension scores. The results 
are depicted in Table 5, and showed moderate to high correlations between Post-test accuracy 
and Cito math and Cito reading comprehension scores, for both the group that had received 
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the pre-test and the group that had not received a pre-test. For the group that had received a 
pre-test, none of the process measures correlated significantly with Cito math or Reading 
comprehension scores. For the groups that had not received a pre-test, GAP was positively 
correlated to Cito math (r = .42, p ≤ .05). Verbalized strategy and Planning time were not 
correlated with Cito math and none of the process measures showed any significant 
correlations with Cito reading comprehension scores. In line with our expectations, none of 
the differences in correlations between the group that had received the pre-test and the group 
that had not were significant.  
 
Table 5 about here 
 
Lastly, the results were analyzed on an item level, because an analysis based on averaged 
scores over multiple items could lead to a distorted picture of the importance of process 
measures. It was expected that the process measures would significantly contribute to the 
prediction of item success, as was found in previous research. Whether or not a child received 
a pre-test was expected to play no role in the prediction of post-test item accuracy. To explore 
the contributing factors to the prediction of item accuracy, a CHAID tree analysis was used. A 
separate data file was constructed where each item was treated as a separate case (n=1188), 
and both the pre-test and post-test items were added, along with the process measures per 
item. Post-test accuracy was used as the dependent variable, and Verbalized strategy, GAP, 
Planning time, Total time, Item number, Phase (pre-test/post-test), and Condition (pre-test 
group/no pre-test group) were added as the independent variables. The minimum number of 
cases per node was set to N = 30, to avoid overfitting. 
 
Figure 3 about here 




 The resulting tree model can be seen in Figure 3. The first split was made based on the Item 
(F(5, 1182) = 41.27, p < .001), and resulted in 6 nodes. Node 1 (n=99), which only included 
item 1, was further split based on Condition (F(1, 97) = 5.58 , p = .020). On item 1, the group 
that had received a pre-test scored significantly higher than the group that had not received a 
pre-test.  
 Node 2 (n=693) included 7 items (item 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9) and was split further based 
on the GAP scores (F(2, 690) = 12.03 , p < .001) into three groups, where lower GAP scores 
predicted lower accuracy scores. The group with the highest GAP scores (Node 11; n=473) 
was split further based on Verbalized strategies (F(1, 471) = 47.84, p <.001), where non-
inductive and partial inductive verbalizations predicted lower accuracy, and full inductive 
verbalized strategy use predicted higher accuracy. Node 3 (n=99), which only included item 
3, was split based on verbalized strategy (F(1, 97) = 8.15, p = .011). On this item, non-
inductive strategies predicted lower accuracy scores, and partial inductive and full inductive 
strategies predicted higher accuracy scores. For item 10 (Node 4) and item 11 (Node 5) the 
item identity itself was the only predictor, no further splits could be made based on the 
available variables. Node 6 (n=99) was split based on the Phase (F(1, 97) = 5.09 , p = .026). 
On item 12 during the pre-test, children had a higher accuracy than on item 12 during the 
post-test.  
 In this analysis, the items themselves were the primary predictor for accuracy. For 
most of the items, GAP added to the prediction of task success, and secondly, Verbalized 
strategy use added to the prediction of accuracy. Condition was included as a predictor in the 
model, but only for the first item. Item 12 was the only item on which the prediction was 
based on whether it was the pre-test or the post-test.   
 




In the current study we sought to examine the effect of a pre-test on the problem solving 
process in the post-test and any effects a pre-test might have on the validity of the results 
obtained on the post-test. Although many theories were developed on possible adverse effects 
of a pre-test/training/post-test design (e.g. Kim & Willson, 2010; Klauer, 1993; Sijtsma, 
1993), to our knowledge, no studies have actively investigated the effects of utilizing a pre-
test in the format used in this article.  
 Firstly, this study investigated whether a pre-test would lead to different outcomes on 
the post-test, both quantitatively on the accuracy of answering the post-test items, and 
qualitatively on the different process measures. Both on accuracy and on the process measures 
no differences were found on the post-test between the group that had received a pre-test and 
the group that had not. Contrary to the theories expressed in the literature about possible 
adverse effects of retesting (Kim & Willson, 2010; Klauer, 1993), our results did not support 
the notion that test-retest effects would lead to different outcomes on the post-test. Also on the 
level of the processes used to solve the tasks, there were no differences between the two 
groups. The result in both groups seems to be the result of the training. In the light of the 
effect of training, we could conclude that the training in our design successfully compensated 
for prior experience with the task, in this case in the shape of the pre-test. This would be in 
line with the long-held belief of some that dynamic testing can serve as a more fair method of 
testing, as it is influenced to a lesser extent by a child’s prior learning experiences (Elliott et 
al., 2010; Haywood & Lidz, 2007; Resing & Elliott, 2011; Sternberg & Grigorenko, 2002). It 
would seem that the graduated prompts training can equalize for children’s differences in 
experience with the task.  
 In line with our expectations, children that had not received a pre-test did not need 
more hints during the training sessions than the children who had received a pre-test. It would 
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seem that the pre-test did not have the learning effect that it was theorized to have by some 
researchers (e.g. Kim & Willson, 2010; Klauer, 1993). The pre-test did not appear to produce 
any learning that led to increased performance or a different need for instruction during 
training. Alternatively, this may have been due to interference of the practice in the pretest, 
with the strategies and skills learned during the training phase. As Opfer and Thompson 
(2008) stated, for some children the additional practice of a pre-test could lead to a further 
consolidation of strategies that are not optimal for solving the task at hand. This interference 
might have led to a less profound learning effect from the pre-test.  
 A concern about dynamic testing that has often been voiced, is the additional time it 
takes to administer, and the costs associated with this. In this light, cutting time by eliminating 
the pre-test might seem like a viable option. The results did not support the idea that 
eliminating the pre-test saves significant time. This may have been a result of the limited 
number of participants, as the testing cycle on average took approximately ten minutes shorter 
for the group that had not received a pretest.  
 With regards to the prediction of post-test accuracy and the relationships between 
accuracy, process measures, and mathematics and reading comprehension, no significant 
differences were found between children that had and that had not received a pre-test. It 
seems that a pre-test does not influence the construct validity of the post-test, but instead the 
training influences the construct validity and compensates for the experience of a pre-test.  
 On the prediction per item, a different picture emerged. The primary predicting factor 
was the item identity, followed by the grouping of answer pieces and verbalized strategy use. 
Whether or not a child had received a pre-test was a factor on the first item only, which is 
most likely caused by familiarity with the task as a result of doing the pre-test (Schorno, 
2013). The contributing factors to item success were the same for the pre-test and the post-
test, except for item number 12. This may have been an effect of the post-test item 
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accidentally being more difficult on the post-test, or due to a lack of motivation at the end of 
the testing cycle. On the contributing factors to item success, process measures seemed to be 
the most valuable predictors. Although this initially would seem to contradict the increase in 
accuracy from pre-test to post-test, it does not. In the model, the increase in accuracy from 
pre-test to post-test was accounted for by the use of more sophisticated problem solving 
strategies. This indicates that the process measures that contribute to item success are the 
same on both the pre-test and the post-test. However, training may lead to more effective 
activation of these problem solving processes on the post-test. The processes that lead to the 
correct solution are activated to a lesser extent during the pre-test, especially in children with 
special needs (Hessels et al., 2011).  
 
Limitations 
Although the results seem to clearly indicate that no difference is found between designs that 
use a pre-test and designs that do not in terms of construct validity, there are some limitations 
to these findings that should be taken into account. The low number of participants in this 
study could have influenced the results, leading to a perceived lack of difference that could 
potentially emerge with a bigger sample size. For a more complete picture of potential effects 
of a pre-test, Kim & Willson (2010) recommended using a Solomon four-group design, in 
which one group receives both a pre-test and a training, one group receives a pre-test and no 
training, one group receives a training but no pre-test, and the last group receives neither a 
pre-test nor a training.   
 Furthermore, it should be taken into account that this study was performed within a 
specific domain and cannot readily be generalized to other domains. Klauer (1993) stated that 
test-retest effects differ between domains. Although he indicated these effects would be more 
prevalent in fluid intelligence domains such as inductive reasoning, further research should 
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focus on investigating the effects within different domains of testing. A broader age range 
would further benefit generalizability of the findings.  
 It should be noted that our results can not readily be generalized to special education 
contexts, as this group tends to use different processes in learning and on solving tasks than 
typically developing children, or may not activate the processes necessary to solve the task 
(Hessels et al., 2011; Tiekstra et al., 2009). Future research should investigate the effects of 
using a pre-test with these children on post-test results.   
Implications and future recommendation 
The results of our research were fairly consistent and provided no support for the notion that 
using a pre-test would influence the results or processes on the post-test. Further, in our 
CHAID analysis no evidence was found that the basic problem solving processes differed 
between the pre-test and the post-test phase. The debate on whether or not a pre-test is 
necessary might not be determined by the effect of a pre-test on the post-test results, but 
instead be a decision based on the questions to be answered and the situation in which the 
testing takes place.   
 In educational settings, the use of a pre-test may serve as a static measure of 
performance and may provide a baseline performance, which serves as a context in which the 
post-test scores can be interpreted. When no pre-test is used the post-test performance can be 
compared to the group average. However, it is not possible to see if someone can indeed 
improve his learning as a result of training, as there is no baseline to improve upon. 
Additionally, for some groups such as children with test anxiety, the pre-test may serve as an 
indicator of the problem experienced in school functioning. As Vogelaar, Bakker, Elliott, and 
Resing (2016) point out, children with test anxiety show differential progression paths from 
pre-test to post-test compared to children without test anxiety, characterized by a greater gain 
in accuracy from pre-test to post-test. Testing without a pre-test could lead testers to overlook 
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the initial low performance of groups like these, leading to a discrepancy between the results 
of the dynamic tests and the everyday performance of the child as seen by parents and 
teachers.  
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Figure 1. Puppet series completion item 
  




Figure 2. Scoring of verbalized strategy use 
  




Figure 3. CHAID tree for the prediction of Accuracy per item  
Pre-test or No pre-test [Kies de datum] 
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